Ridvan Peshkopia
Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies
The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

D. Stephen Voss
Department of Political Science
University of Kentucky

Kujtim Bytyqi
American University of Tirana

ONE ETHNIC GROUP OR TWO: PREJUDICE AND EXPOSURE AMONG MONTENEGRINS AND SERBS IN THE INDEPENDENT MONTENEGRO

Ridvan Peshkopia is Dean of College of Sciences and Humanities with the American University of Tirana. He received a Graduate Certificate in Managing International Conflicts from the University of Kentucky Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, an M.A. from the University of Kentucky's Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce as well as a M.A. and a PhD from the University of Kentucky's Department of Political Science, College of Arts and Sciences. During the academic year 2010-2011, he was a postdoctoral fellow with the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, the Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University.

D. Stephen Voss received his MA and PhD from Harvard University and is an Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies with the Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky.

Kujtim Bytyqi is a Lecturer with the FAMA University, Kosovo and an Adjunct Lecturer with the American University of Tirana. He holds a MA in Diplomacy from Westminster University.

Contact: Ridvan Peshkopia
College of Sciences and Humanities
American University of Tirana
Autoudha Tiranë-Durrës, Km 5
Tirana, Albania
Tel.: ++355 672060350
E-mail: ridvanpeshkopia@yahoo.com; rpeshkopia@uat.edu

One Ethnic Group or Two: Prejudices and Exposure Between Montenegrins and Serbs in the Independent Montenegro

Introduction

For more almost seven decades now, contributors to intergroup contact theory have developed an enormous conceptual and empirical research to test the hypothesis that contacts between competing and/or hostile groups reduce prejudices and debunk stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew 1998; Brewer, 2001; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). However, in order to produce prejudice reduction rather than the opposite effect, intergroup contacts should happen under the conditions of equality among groups, as well as the existence of a common purpose along with social norms and legal frameworks that encourage intergroup contacts as a tool for forging social cohesion.

Critics have pointed to research design problems with both conceptual and empirical work on intergroup social theory (Forbes, 2004). The most severe of those problems that bothers contributors and critics alike is the endogenous relationship between contacts and prejudices (Forbes, 2004; Pettigrew, 2006, 1998). In other words, do intergroup contacts reduce prejudices or do people establish such contacts because they do not carry any prejudices in the first place. In order to overcome this problem, Pettigrew (1998, 69) suggests (1) the selection of a case situation that severely limits choices; (2) the use of cross-sectional data analysis that help to compare the reciprocal paths (contact→prejudice reduction and prejudice reduction→contact); and (3) build longitudinal research designs as the best way to resolve the problem. Elsewhere, trying to explain Albanians' attitudes toward Greeks, Peshkopia, Voss and Bytyqi (2011) have considered the contact between those—otherwise not too friendly—ethnic groups caused by the

massive Albanian migration to Greece during the 1990s as a case that falls within Pettigrew's first suggestion. Another case, that of the relations between those citizens of Montenegro who identify themselves as ethnic Montenegrins and those who claim to be Bosniaks and ethnic Serbs might be even a stronger case. Historically, the division line between those who self-identify as ethnic Montenegrins with those who claim to be ethnic Serbs has been blurry, and only by the second half of the 1990s, the ethnic identity debate surfaced in Montenegro, arguably, mostly as a reflection of country's political orientation (Bieber, 20003; Casperen, 2003). Therefore, now, the detachment after a lifelong contact is happening. Moreover, this detachment is not happening because of ethnic prejudices but because elite power calculations (Bieber, 2003; Casperen 2003; Huszka 2003). Therefore, by being considered the same nation, the contacts between ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs in Montenegro were not a matter of choice but the state of society. Now that separation, as recorded by different accounts, has brought political frictions between both groups, prejudices between them are expected to further divide those groups.[1]

It is easily perceptible that such a historical context suggests a minimal variance of contacts between ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs as a key independent variable. Therefore, the only way to draw inferences is to consider also the effects of intergroup contacts on some other ethnic groups in Montenegro, namely ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks and Roma. If the contact hypothesis holds, we should expect that, due to the lifetime close contacts between the ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs, the political frictions of the late 1990s and the 2000s should have left no deep scars in their mutual feelings, and each of them is expected to like the other better than they like the other ethnic groups. Finally, both Montenegrins and Serbs will tend to like better those outgroup members whom they have met somehow. We also control for the role of other social factors on group members' attitudes toward outgroup members. We analyze data collected

through public opinion surveys in several cities and towns in Montenegro in June and December 2010.

Intergroup contact theory and ethnic conflict: a literature review

The fundamental promise of intergroup contact theory is that more contacts between individuals belonging to antagonistic social groups (defined by culture, language, beliefs, skin color, nationality, etc.) tend to undermine the negative stereotypes and reduce their mutual antipathies, thus improving intergroup relations by making people more willing to deal with each other as equals. Living in isolation, groups tend to develop intergroup bias, a systematic tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (the in-group) or its members more favorably than a non-membership group (the out-group) or its members (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002). In a nutshell, more contact means less ethnic or cultural conflict, other things being equal (Miller 2002; Brewer and Gaertner 2001; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000; Pettigrew 1998a,b, 1971; Hamburger 1994; Amir 1976; Zajonc 1968; Works 1961; Allport 1954).

Contact theory has attracted enormous empirical work in social settings characterized by deeply divided societies. Initially, Allport (1954) drew mainly from research conducted in the United States. Until the 1990s, the contribution of American scholars remained limited in studying anti-Black prejudices (Cook 1984; Hamilton and Bishop 1976), and only recently turned their focus on other ethnic minorities (see Levin, Laar, and Sidanius 2003). Beyond the United States, intergroup contact theory has been employed to explain intergroup relations in a large variety of countries including Australia (Griffiths and Nesdale 2006), Western Europe (Tajfel ed. 1982), Europe (see the special issues of *Journal of Social Issues* edited by Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner (2008: 223-430)), and South Africa (see the special issue of *Journal of*

Social Studies edited by Finchilescu and Tredoux (2010: 223-351)), as well as relations among groups that differ from each other in other aspects.[2]

Recently, intergroup contact theory has been employed to explore effects of intergroup contacts in regions with violent ethnic conflicts. The work performed on the Northern Ireland conflict (Hewstone et al. 2006; Hewstone et al. 2004; Tam et al. 2008; Tausch et al.2007) has brought strong support for the hypotheses of the contact theory, and so has Sentama's (2009) work on the post-conflict Rwanda. However, to our knowledge, the theory has not been tested in the Balkans, and the special place that the region occupies in the studies of ethnic conflict begs for empirical work in that direction.

Critics of contact theory come from political science. Ideologies and the social norms that they produce assign stereotyped identities to members of other groups, and the nature of these social norms rather than interpersonal contacts make the difference between peaceful and *conflictual* relations (Jowit 2002; O'Leary 2002; McGarry and O'Leary 1995). This approach builds on a rational assumption and is supported by the widely known fact that most of the twentieth century's ethnic killings have been performed by states under strong rational motivations rather than irrational crowd hysteria (Chirot 2002: 6). The elite-led breakups of former Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia serve as strong supports of this argument (Roskin 2002; Zimmerman 1996).

Our common knowledge tells that contending groups tend to live adjacent to each other and that contact between neighbors tend to breed conflict. Forbes (2004) explains this paradox with the lopsided individual-level view of social psychologists, and suggests a model that would take into account fears of and resistance to assimilations that groups exhibit against perceived or real threats from other groups.[3] Moreover, critics of the contact theory point to—and its

contributors are aware of—the endogenous relationship between contact and prejudice; people tend to contact out-groups toward whom they nurture positive feelings and shun contacts with out-groups toward whom they carry negative perceptions and stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Forbes 2004; Voss, 1998; Wilson 1996; Herek and Capitanio 1996). Empirical work tries to resolve this issue either by using cross-sectional data and analyzing which path is stronger—in the studies of Van Dick et al. (2004), Pettigrew (1997), Powers and Ellison (1995), Butler and Wilson (1978) the path from contact to reduced prejudices is stronger. Alternatively, scholars might conduct longitudinal studies as the best way to resolve that problem (Pettigrew 1998)—in the case of Eller and Abrams (2003, 2004), Levin, van Laar, and Sidanius (2003), and Sherif (1966) longitudinal analysis show that optimal contact reduces prejudices over time (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006).

Those results come from analyzing cases when the two ethnic groups live in the same political entity and have multiple opportunities of interaction. However, there might be cases when ethnic groups live close to yet totally separated from each other. As many scholars who study the Balkans have pointed out, the Balkan people live close to each other, not with each other (Kaplan 2004; Roskin 2002; Brown 2001). Only now, after the end of the isolationist communist regimes, the end of the Yugoslav wars, and some liberalization of travelling throughout the region are the Balkan people contacting and exchanging with each other.

Methodology and data

Methodology

We test the intergroup contact theory with the case of effects that contact makes on Albanians' perceptions of Greeks through regression analysis of both personal and aggregate data, thus

allowing us to control for group reactions arguably generated from intergroup contact. We employ as a dependent variable the feeling temperature of Albanians towards Greeks in the range between 0 and 100. Since this variable could take any value between these margins, we employ linear regression analysis.

We employ a range of independent variables that operationalize the response of whether or not someone has met an outgroup member (Albanian, Bosniak, Montenegrin, Roma and Serb), age, class, household economic performance during the last year, gender, residential site, education, the fact that someone might have migrated abroad, whether or not they prioritize policies such as increasing employment and Montenegro's membership in the European Union (EU), as well as their perception of outgroup members as a threat to Montenegro's sovereignty. Moreover, we control for some of Allport's (1954) favorable conditions.

However, while the historical context offers us an interesting case with almost all the ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs reporting to have met the other outgroup members, it also offers a more colorful, and even challenging, environment for testing Allport's conditions. Let us start with Allport's claim that intergroup contacts reduce prejudices only if people from different groups meet as equals, a claim that recently has been shown not to be always necessary (Peshkopia, Voss and Bytyqi 2011; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). All citizens of Montenegro are equal to the law, and even though the Albanian community claims more group rights, Montenegro's citizens from that ethnic group participate with full political and economic rights in the life of the country. Since the Roma community in Montenegro, like in every other Balkan country, suffers unofficial, widespread discrimination in daily basis, their small sample (only four respondents) inhibits us from drawing statistically significant inferences.

Difficulties rest with testing other conditions as well. Thus, if we consider the EU membership as a common project among all Montenegro's ethnic groups; hence, if Allport is right, those citizens of Montenegro who prioritize their country's EU membership should feel warmer toward the other ethnic groups than those who do not emphasize such priority. However, especially for ethnic Albanians and Serbs from whom respectively Tirana and Belgrade respectively remain powerful gravitational centers of shaping their political preferences, the attitudes toward Montenegro's EU bid might fluctuate following Tirana's and Belgrade's political preferences on that matter rather than the very fate of Montenegro.

As for Allport's claim that contacts reduce prejudices only in the conditions when social norms, legal frameworks and leaders encourage them, even though the legal framework of Montenegro seems indifferent toward encouragement of intergroup contacts, the behavior of country's political elites is more complex. First, as we mentioned above, the divisions between ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs were politically thrust upon them by political leaders during the debate on whether or not Montenegro should declare independence from the rump Yugoslavia, and later, the Serbia Montenegro Union, with leaders of the Ethnic Montenegrins pushing for independence and leaders of ethnic Serbs of Montenegro even denying the existence of a Montenegrin ethnicity. On the other hand, in order to amass the necessary popular majority for independence, the ethnic Montenegrin leaders courted ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks. On the other hand, the ethnic Serbian leaders supported their efforts to keep the Serbo-Montenegrin federation alive, among others, by portraying Serbia as a guarantor of Montenegro's territoriality, thus pointing to the danger that ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks would present to the sovereignty of an independent Montenegro. And finally, religion as a social structure divides the mostly Muslim Albanians and Bosniaks from the Orthodox Montenegrins and Serbs. Another

norm, the cohabitation between different ethnic and religious groups in the Balkans, even though it has had sometimes decades in its disposition to forge a lasting peace, often has shown to be an easy victim of the storms of nationalistic rhetoric and ethnic conflict.

Literature in social psychology has recently argued that the constraints normally in place, which limit intergroup bias to in-group favoritism, are lifted when out-groups are associated with stronger emotions (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears et al. 1998; Mackie and Smith 1998; Brewer 2001; Mummendey, Otten, Berger, et al. 2001). Meanwhile, some political scientists tend to place ethnic conflict on existential anxieties caused by fears of assimilation and perception of group extinction (Forbes 2006; Kaufman 2001). Therefore, it is easily conceivable how fear generates Balkan ethnic conflict. Abundant historical account and qualitative research has shed empirical light on such claim (Mulaj 2008), but this would be a good opportunity to test Forbes claim that fears of assimilation from lager and wealthier groups generate more prejudices against that group from members of the group that feels threatened.

Data

Like the other Balkan countries, the underdeveloped state of social research in Montenegro makes gathering data harder. Montenegro is a small country of only 650,000 inhabitants who gained independence only in 2006. Because its size, late independence, communist legacy, uncertain transition, the country lacks established survey institutes and private polling organizations of the size and variety found in Western Europe and North America; nor do external organizations of that sort regularly employ people with the linguistic and cultural background to operate in Montenegro.

Similar to ethnic minorities in the rest of the Balkans, the Albanian, Bosniak and, to a much lesser extent the Serbian, minorities live too much of an extent geographically and culturally isolated to a degree than found in even the most segregated industrialized societies. In order to find the proper variance, we conducted surveys in three parts of the country: in the northeast we surveyed in the towns of Rozaj and Bijelopolje inhabited by a Bosniak majority; in the capital city, Podgorica, we sampled a metropolitan population with intensive contacts among the main ethnic groups, Montenegrins and Serbs; and in the southwestern city of Bar and Ulcinje, with the former being a mixture of all ethnic groups living in Montenegro and the latter the hub of the Albanian minority in Montenegro. Throughout this line running through the capital city of Podgorica we are confident that the geographic distribution of our survey sample covers the potentially best sample frame. Indeed, as the sample itself shows, due to the high internal mobility and the small size of the country, we have been able to interview people from all Montenegrin regions who have happened to be on the survey sites.

Conventional sampling methods are inappropriate for our specific research question. Our lack of appropriate tools to conduct telephone or email surveys, and the impossibility to implement door-to-door sampling methods—partly because residential patterns are complicated by the close proximity of single-family and multi-family dwellings, and partly because in most communities either the norms, the family structure, or suspicion of the state rules out approaching people in their homes—risked to turn conventional methods in producers of strong and systematic biases in the sample. For these reasons, we are representing here findings from the Three-Region Survey of Montenegro Citizens' Perceptions of Outgroups within the Seven-Country Survey of Balkan Perceptions of Ethnic, Racial and Social Divisions using trained interviewers. The survey combines a stratified design for selecting communities with non-

probability methods for identifying individual respondents that were tailored to suit the living patterns found in each community. The stratification approach maximizes sample variation across the main explanatory variables: ethnicity of respondent, socioeconomic class, age, gender, religion affiliation, education, migration, political preferences, and likelihood to have contacted someone from other ethnic groups living in the country. The non-probability sampling within each community, on the other hand, attempts to approach as closely as possible the ideal of randomization, thus seeking a representative population on possible intervening variables.

The survey went into the field in the June of 2010 in Ulcinje, a small touristic town near the Albanian border where the majority ethnic Albanian population lives almost isolated from the rest of the country. In December 2010, teams of our interviewers conducted surveys in Rozaje and Bijelopolje near the Kosovo border, in the capital city of Podgorica located in the center-south, and in the coastal city of Bar. In December, we also returned to Ulcinje in order to increase the size of the sample from that area. Table 1 includes the survey sites in Montenegro.

Table 1. Survey sites in Montenegro

Country	Name	Alternate Name	Majority
MONTENEGRO	Podgorica, Capital city		Montenegrin
MONTENEGRO	Town of Rozaj		Bosniak
MONTENEGRO	Town of Bijelopolje		Bosniak
MONTENEGRO	Town of Ulcinje	Ulqin	Albanian
MONTENEGRO	City of Bar		Montenegrin/Serb

Although the specific approach of the Seven-Country Survey of Balkan Perceptions of Ethnic, Racial and Social Divisions to selecting respondents varied from community to community, according to the social patterns encountered in each place, certain traits of the interviewing remained constant. Every questionnaire was delivered in a face-to-face interview,

with questions posed in the respondent's primary language by an interviewer of the same ethnic background. In the case discussed by this paper, the questionnaires were conducted in Albanian. The research teams dispatched to each community consisted entirely of university students trained by the authors, either in a University of New York Tirana (UNYT) research methods course or in an abbreviated 'survey methodology certificate' program designed specifically for recruits to this survey. Both sets of students received an introduction to systematic interviewing and to the concept of scientific sampling. They practiced filling out questionnaire forms efficiently, to prevent respondents from dropping off during the interview. They were instructed on how to avoid the negative effects of selection bias: by dressing professionally to elicit good responses, by approaching potential respondents in a fashion that would encourage their cooperation, and by practicing the phonetics needed to ask individual questions.

Members of the research team spread out within each city and town to ensure maximum geographic dispersion. Typically interviewers traveled to a public place and, after taking up their posts, identified potential respondents using what in the American context is casually called "man on the street" interviewing—and among scholars referred to (even more derisively) as convenience sampling. The standard dismissal of this research design is so widespread, and the concern with potential selection bias when considering this method so severe, that it is worth explaining why we view the approach as the superior option given our research goals.

Despite skepticism for such methods when applied in the Western context, the research environment in the Balkans strongly favors conducting surveys in public spaces, and not simply due to the inefficacy of rival approaches. Rather, much of Balkan social life takes place in "the bazaar"—from village squares to town fountains to city parks or gardens, from highly trafficked downtown sidewalks to smaller shops or cafes—so a potential respondent will view a stranger's

12

approach in public places as acceptable if not natural. In many of the communities selected for our survey, the common practice is for families to promenade at dusk, unwinding after a busy day in anticipation of their nightly meal. Much of the population will be out and about during prime time. Far from resisting taking a survey during such times of relaxation, potential respondents typically enjoyed the diversion represented by a discussion of public affairs with young students from the nearby university. A public approach also obviates the anxiety that respondents might feel when approached by an educated stranger at their homes. Ironically, approaching respondents in their homes posed quite a different research burden when the interview subjects trusted the members of our student team. Some other times, interviewers could not conduct interviews efficiently because the expectations of Balkan hospitality required that respondents invite the student inside, offer them refreshment, and otherwise extend the conversation beyond sustainable limits. Simply put, awareness of the rhythms of Balkan life cautions a researcher against trying to transplant Western survey mechanisms to the region.

While participation in this public sphere is so widespread that "man on the street" interviewing does not bring the sort of selection bias that it would in other industrialized countries, indeed arguably represents an "appropriate technology" given Balkan community life, that does not mean we can dismiss other forms of bias that typically will emerge from a sample of convenience. Specifically, we had to train interviewers against selecting for the most cooperative potential respondents and toward selecting a more representative sample. Interviewers dispatched to public areas would establish a rubric, typically to approach the third person encountered after each attempt to conduct an interview. Yet in some small and sparsely populated villages, they had to interview every person they encountered. Interviewing took place not only around twilight (roughly 6 pm – 9 pm in the summer and 2 pm – 6 pm in winter), when

most citizens are engaging in public life out of doors, but also in the morning (roughly 9 am – 12 pm) because those hours allow access to the one population that would be most poorly represented in the evening: Women with large families whose household duties might bind them to the home.[4]

The overall design of the Three-Region Survey of Montenegro Citizens' Perceptions of Outgroups within the Seven-Country Survey of Balkan Perceptions on Ethnic, Racial and Social Divisions therefore is, without a doubt, a non-probability sample that permits no straightforward analytical derivation of sampling error. At root, confidence in the results cannot be reduced to a simple number, and must derive from the combination of scientific principles and sensitivity to research context that informed the overall design. Our hope is that other scholars will appreciate the theoretical leverage provided by this survey, which sits at the border between the responsiveness of ethnographic research and the generality of large-n statistical research. It is as close to a stratified representative sample as we can imagine one collecting from these countries, certainly without the sort of exorbitant expenditure that few research questions could justify. Our approach allows us to expand the study of important substantive topics to places often missed because of their imperviousness to more comfortable and familiar research methods. Specifically, it gives us the valuable theoretical leverage provided by the Balkans for understanding the political psychology of ethnic and social divisions in the Balkans and finding out how they would interplay in order to overcome such rifts.

Variables

Analysis

Table 2 compiles descriptive statistics of the dependent variable, namely the feeling temperature of Montenegro's four main ethnic groups for each other and two other minor ethnic groups who live in Montenegro: Croats and the Roma. We probed people's feeling temperature toward the Macedonians and Greeks in order to inquire whether some cultural similarities and differences outside the Montenegrin context, but within the Balkan political context, might count for people's feeling temperatures toward them. We also gagged temperature feelings for the Americans, as we expect deep sentiments toward them in the region.[5] We also asked people about their feeling temperature toward homosexuals. However, some of these variables are not parts of our models.

Our four ethnic groups can be grouped according to two patterns: First, the ethnolinguistic pattern where on the one side rest three groups who speak the same Slavic language (Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Serbs); and on the other the Albanians who speak their own, non-Slavic language. Second, the religious pattern where on the one side rest the predominantly Muslim Albanians and the Bosniaks; and on the other the Christian Orthodox Montenegrins and Serbs. A glance at the data shows that feeling temperatures across these groups does not follow any of those patterns and variation exists both within each pattern and cross patterns. For instance, one might think that Albanians might like their fellow Muslim Bosniaks better due to religious affinity (53.32), but surprisingly we discover that Serbs beat them in those feelings (58.15). In turn, Montenegrins seem to like Albanians more than Bosniaks (59.74 versus 54.79), a fact that undercuts both the ethnolinguistic and the religious patterns. However, Albanians seem to nurture lower regard for the Macedonians (28.89), another southern Slavic population than what members of the other three groups feel for Macedonians: Bosniaks

15

Table 2. Feeling Temperatures for the Outgroup Members Among the Ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Serbs Living in Montenegro

Feeling Temperatures	Albanians	Bosniak/Muslims	Montenegrins	Serbs
Feeling temperatures for Albanians	Observations: 209 Mean: 91.38 S.D.: 19.42 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 48 Mean: 54.79 S.D.: 40.48 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 155 Mean: 59.74 S.D.: 38.11 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 53 Mean: 36.23 S.D.: 37.89 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Americans	Observations: 177 Mean: 59.29 S.D.: 33.85 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 52.39 S.D.: 46.82 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 151 Mean: 52.32 S.D.: 38.64 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 54 Mean: 38.52 S.D.: 39.78 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling of temperatures for Bosniak/Muslims	Observations: 177 Mean: 53.32 S.D.: 31.96 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 47 Mean: 97.45 S.D.: 14.81 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 151 Mean: 76.69 S.D.: 32.67 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 54 Mean: 58.15 S.D.: 35.45 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Croats	Observations: 173 Mean: 35.88 S.D.: 30.95 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 48 Mean: 62.50 S.D.: 40.92 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 151 Mean: 59.11 S.D.: 37.39 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 57 Mean: 55.96 S.D.: 38.31 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Greeks	Observations: 177 Mean: 14.53 S.D.: 23.91 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 38.91 S.D.: 44.63 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 151 Mean: 49.64 S.D.: 36.20 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 58 Mean: 53.62 S.D.: 41.07 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Macedonians	Observations: 178 Mean: 28.89 S.D.: 28.61 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 47 Mean: 67.23 S.D.: 39.33 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 152 Mean: 66.45 S.D.: 32.86 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 55 Mean: 68.91 S.D.: 33.09 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Montenegrins	Observations: 183 Mean: 46.94 S.D.: 33.08 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 92.39 S.D.: 23.49 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 157 Mean: 93.25 S.D.: 20.42 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 58 Mean: 90.52 S.D.: 23.80 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for the Roma	Observations: 167 Mean: 25.49 S.D.: 30.69 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 41.96 S.D.: 40.31 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 152 Mean: 48.78 S.D.: 37.82 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 55 Mean: 33.27 S.D.: 37.81 Min.: 0 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Serbs	Observations: 183 Mean: 20.56 S.D.: 28.11 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 48 Mean: 59.38 S.D.: 41.43 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 155 Mean: 81.94 S.D.: 29.57 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 59 Mean: 95.68 S.D.: 14.03 Min.: 50 Max.: 100
Feeling temperatures for Homosexuals	Observations: 165 Mean: 14.80 S.D.: 29.20 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 1.52 S.D.: 7.88 Min.: 0 Max.: 50	Observations: 149 Mean: 15.17 S.D.: 31.66 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 48 Mean: 12.92 S.D.: 31.75 Min.: 0 Max.: 100

(67.23), Montenegrins (66.45), and Serbs (68.91). By the same token, Albanians feel less warm toward Croats (35.88) than members of the other three groups feel toward the latter: Bosniaks (62.50), Montenegrins (37.39), and Serbs (38.31). This is a clear signal that there is a tendency to

set apart Albanians from the other Slavic speaking groups, but the latter are far from having a harmonious relationship among them. The only point where both ethnolinguistic and religious pertinence overlap, the case of Montenegrins and Serbs, feeling temperatures show mutual high regards (81.94 and 90.52).

Moreover, interesting interpretations could come with feeling temperatures toward Greeks of the Albanians (14.53), Bosniaks (38.91), Montenegrins (49.64), and Serbs (53.62). Usually Greece has an almost invisible role in Montenegrin politics and society, and yet people, especially Albanians, seem to nurture deep negative feelings toward them. The fact that Serbs rest on the other opposition, might instruct us that, rather than personal perceptions, Albanians' and Serbs' feelings toward the Greeks are affected by politics of their mother countries, namely Albania and Serbia, as well as the regional extension of Albanian-Serb rivalries and the Greek alignment with the latter over the international status of Kosovo.[6]

Serbs of Montenegro tend to be more friendly toward the Albanians of Montenegro even when the latter do not respond similarly to those feelings (36.23 versus 20.56); while they share feelings at comparable levels with the Bosniaks (58.15 versus 59.38). But Serbs of Montenegro do not look extremely hostile against Croats as well (55.96), even though the memories of the Croat and Bosnian wars have affected the Serbs of Montenegro as well. On the other hand, they don't seem extremely friendly with Greeks (53.62), even though the latter have been their unwavering allies throughout all the post-Yugoslav turmoil.

Going to the core of our argument, our data suggest that the political divisions of the late 1990s and the 2000s have not managed to dramatically the Montenegrins and Serbs with the feeling temperatures for the out-group members respectively 81.94 and 90.52. However, due to the fact that almost every Montenegrin in our sample responded to have met a Serb and vice

versa, it is impossible to detect the effect of contacts on feeling temperatures between these groups.

Table 3 comprises three predictive models of temperature feelings of ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks/Muslims and ethnic Serbs toward ethnic Montenegrins. The dependent variable, respondents' feeling temperature toward ethnic Montenegrins, and two independent variables, people policy preferences toward the EU and employment are opinion variables while the rest of the variables can be considered to be aggregate variables even though we gathered them by asking people of their values. Ethnic Montenegrins are dropped from the sample. The limited space allows for the detailed interpretation of only the most relevant variables.

Results from Model 1A support our findings in other research conducted on such topic; feeling temperature for out-group members from rival ethnic groups tends to increase with age (represented by a coefficient value of -0.21), and a decrease in household incomes tends to curb feeling temperature toward out-group members (a coefficient value of 12.95). Both these values carry statistical confidence. The coefficient of our key variable (whether or not someone has met an ethnic Montenegrin) goes in the predicted direction but it lacks statistical significance. Coefficients of other variables go in the predicted directions: education and aspiration to join the EU make someone to feel warmer toward out-group members, while being male conditions lower temperature feelings toward out-group members. It should be noted that the coefficients of these variables lack statistical significance and we remain cautious to draw conclusions from them at this stage. What puzzles us, however, is the direction of the coefficient of the variable that operationalizes the prioritization of employment policy; we expected that people who prioritize employment are usually unemployed and the latter usually generates bitter feelings against out-group members, especially when they are from country's dominant ethnicity.

TABLE 3 - Explaining the feeling temperature of ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks/Muslims and ethnic Serbs toward ethnic Montenegrins

Linear Regression	MODEL 1A Predictive Model		MODEL 1B Predictive Model		MODEL 1C Predictive Model	
Serb			10.43		-0.28	
			(10.597)		(14.208)	
Bosniak/Muslim			7.1		-17.38	
			(11.087)		(29.680)	
Albanian			-33.242	***	-37.78	
			(10.012)		(14.208)	
Year born	-0.21	*	-0.21		-0.09	
	(0.240)		(0.157)		(0.171)	
Years of education	0.18		0.623		0.38	
	(1.688)		(0.792)		(-0.842)	
Gender/Male	-0.29		-7.69	*	-8.78	**
	(8.331)		(4.130)		(-4.290)	
Trend in household incomes	12.95	**	1.94		1.97	
	(5.616)		(2.882)		(-2.954)	
EU as policy priority	3.48		3.14	***	2.74	*
	(2.637)		(1.491)		(1.550)	
Employment as a policy priority	5.42		6.19	***		
	(3.240)		(1.779)			
Employed in private sector					1.24	
					(8.944)	
Employed in public sector					10.14	
					(9.542)	
Self-employed					-1.99	
					(9.546)	
Unemployed					-1.73	
					(9.494)	
Met a Montenegrin	1.12		23.73	*	5.09	
	(18.380)		(13.630)		(16.795)	
Bosniak/Muslim met a Monetnegrin					43.2	
					(27.608)	
Albanian met a Monenegrin					19.99	
					(21.769)	
Muslim religion					32.03	
					(22.384)	
Catholic religion					45.39	*
					(24.130)	
Eastern Orthodox religion					58.87	**
					(25.414)	
Ever migrated	-16.31	*	2.81		3.95	
	(8.745)		(4.890)		(4.804)	
Constant	437.3		434.71		189.88	
	(471.056)		(309.335)		(335.827)	
Observations	50		239		236	
Adjusted-R^2	0.135		0.333		0.314	

NOTE: All models use the post-stratification weights provided with the survey data. Standard errors reported in parentheses: *** p < .01 ** p < .05 * p < .1

However, the lack of statistical significance of that variable show that such findings might well be an accident, and that responses on that question are so spread so it is not possible to confidently notice any impact of this variable on the dependent variable. What surprises us at this point is the high impact that migration has on lower feeling temperatures toward ethnic Montenegrins (-16.31 with a $p < 0.1$ statistical significance).

The introduction of ethnicity in Model 1B seems to bring more clarity. Being an ethnic Albanian in Montenegro strongly signifies lower feeling temperature for ethnic Montenegrins (-33.242) while being an ethnic Serb predicts rather without statistical significance warmer feelings toward Montenegrins (10.42). Now that much of the effect on people's feeling temperature on ethnic Montenegrins have been taken over by ethnicity, results that conform existing arguments as well as out theoretical claims surface: first, past meetings with an ethnic Montenegrin predict warmer feeling temperature toward them (coefficient value of 23.73 and $p < 0.1$) and EU membership as a common project causes people to feel warmer toward out-group members (coefficient value of 3.14 and $p < 0.01$).

While Model 1C seems to be weaker than the previous two models, he remains very instructive for our purpose. We introduce here two groups of variables: employment and religion. Variables in both these groups seem to have taken some of the weight of other variables. Thus, for instance, the variable "Eastern Orthodox" receives a coefficient of 58.87—indeed, the higher coefficient of any variable of this group of models—with a $p < 0.05$. Knowing that only ethnic Montenegrins and Serbs practice Eastern Orthodoxy in Montenegro, we can infer strong feelings of oneness from ethnic Serbs toward ethnic Montenegrins. As a

result, the -0.28 coefficient value of the variable "Serb" with a $p > 0.1$ can be considered as random noise.

Model 1C brings about some more developments. First, it asserts that ethnic prejudices in the Balkan might be men's business as the coefficient value of the "Gender" variable drops to -8.78 for a $p < 0.05$. Second, EU membership aspirations continues to predict warmer feelings toward the out-group members as the respective variable takes a coefficient value of 2.74 for a $p < 0.1$.

Models 2A, 2B, and 2C explain the weight of the selected variables on people's feeling temperature toward ethnic Serbs in Montenegro, with Serbs themselves dropped from the sample. From the ethnicity variable, being an ethnic Albanian shows a strong negative impact on feeling temperature (-39.25 and $p < 0.001$), while being an ethnic Montenegrin tends to affect feeling temperature positively (16.1) and being a Bosniak/Muslim tends to affect it negatively (-20.44), but none of them carries any statistical significance.

Model 2B introduces two sets of new variables: employment category and religion affiliation. Variables such as Serb, Bosniak/Muslim and Albanian experience slim coefficient values but both their directions and statistical significance remain the same. Now the variable Trends in Household Incomes gains a $p < 0.1$ for a coefficient value of -5.1, thus showing a growing nervousness of other ethnic groups against Serbs in the conditions of economic decline. Moreover, the variable Unemployed show a negative impact of unemployment on feeling temperature against Serbs for a $p < 0.01$, thus showing that people are inclined to blame Serbs, the most powerful minority, for their economic woes. Being a Catholic (they are only among the Albanians) show greater sympathy for Serbs while, as predicted, affiliation with Eastern Orthodoxy strongly impact positive feelings toward Serbs.

21

TABLE 4 - Explaining the feeling temperature of ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks/Muslims and ethnic Montenegrins toward ethnic Serbs

Linear Regression	MODEL 2A Predictive Model		MODEL 2B Predictive Model		MODEL 2C Predictive Model	
Montenegrin	16.1		16.08		15.81	
	(11.676)		(10.820)		(10.836)	
Bosniak/Muslim	-20.44		-13.62		-55.64	
	(12.573)		(11.475)		(35.282)	
Albanian	-39.25	***	-35.9	***	-39.79	**
	(11.510)		(10.385)		(21.365)	
Year born	0.08		0.08		0.09	
	(0.154)		(0.170)		(0.171)	
Years of education	0.17		-0.76		-0.68	
	(0.797)		(0.797)		(0.800)	
Gender/Male	-3.72		-5.17		-4.75	
	(4.112)		(0.797)		(4.120)	
Trend in household incomes	-5.54		-5.1	*	-5.56	*
	(2.759)		(2.776)		(2.814)	
Perception of Serbia as a threat	-7.79		-7.48		-7.64	
	(5.220)		(5.039)		(5.046)	
Perception of Serb minority as threat	-13.23		-0.48		-0.46	
	(5.882)		(0.521)		(0.521)	
EU as policy priority	3.14	***	-1.99		-2.13	
	(1.491)		(1.477)		(1.481)	
Employment as a policy priority	6.19	***				
	(1.779)					
Employed in private sector			0.42		-0.08	
			(9.275)		(9.288)	

Employed in public sector		-1.06	-1.43
		(9.655)	*(9.670)*
Self-employed		-11.48	-11.81
		(9.551)	*(9.560)*
Unemployed		-3.94 ***	-3.48
		(9.656)	*(9.667)*
Met a Serb		21.78	16.25
		(7.730)	*(7.730)*
A Bosniak/Muslim met a Serb			43.05
			(34.059)
An Albanian met a Serb			3.53
			(19.104)
Muslim religion		32.03	14.6
		(22.384)	*(21.017)*
Catholic religion		45.39 *	37.11
		(24.130)	*(22.834)*
Eastern Orthodox religion		58.87 **	29.21
		(21.649)	*(21.666)*
Ever migrated	2.81	8.02	8.73 *
	(4.890)	*(4.675)*	*(4.713)*
Constant	434.71	-108.59	-113.61
	(309.335)	*(333.397)*	*(333.943)*
Observations	256	249	249
Adjusted-R^2	0.487	0.524	0.524

NOTE: All models use the post-stratification weights provided with the survey data. Standard errors reported in parentheses: *** $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$ * $p < .1$

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[1] The following table borrowed from Florian Bieber (2011) summarizes the percentages of ethnic groups in the Montenegro population.

Table 0. The Percentages of Ethnic Groups in the Population of Montenegro, 1991-2011

Ethnicity	1991	2003	2011
Montenegrins	61.84	43.16	44.98
Serbs	9.29	31.99	28.73
Bosniaks		7.79	8.65
Muslims	14.6	3.97	3.31
Albanians	6.64	5.03	4.91
Yugoslavs	4.2	0.3	0.19
Croats	1.02	1.1	0.97

As the Table show, the 1991 census makes no difference between Montenegrins and Serbs, considering all them to be Montenegrins. The rifts emerged during the second half of the 1990s and since have shaped the power struggle in the country. By the same token, the 1991 census did not mention the Bosniak identity and lumped all the Slavic speaking Muslims into the category of Muslims. However, the 2003 census unveiled that the Bosniak identity was more preferable to most of the members of that category, although it is very difficult to find any other reference except from self-declaration that would make the difference between Bosniaks and Muslims, thus we consider them as the Bosniak/Muslim category.

[2] For an application of the intergroup contact theory to explain heterosexuals' attitudes toward homosexuals see Herek and Capitanio (1996); for an application of the theory in cases of contacts between healthy and diseased people, see Link and Cullen (1986) and Harper and Wacker (1985).
[3] Brown and Hewstone (2005) point out that the reduction of prejudice broadly generated from the contact would include also the group level analysis.
[4] Morning times are best for catching household women, who have time to spare while shopping for groceries. Women interviewed during the day also need not answer the questions under the scrutiny of their husbands.
[5] In order to gage people's attitude toward a group totally outside of the Balkan context, we asked them of their feeling temperature toward the Argentineans. We used this variable mainly to detect whether respondents were paying attention to the questionnaire and the interviewing process. Their responses brings us to the conclusion that they were reasonably attentive and responsive. Table 2-1 summarizes those responses:

Table 2-1. Feeling Temperatures for the Argentineans Among the Ethnic Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins and Serbs Living in Montenegro

Feeling Temperatures	Albanians	Bosniak/Muslims	Montenegrins	Serbs
Feeling temperatures for Argentineans	Observations: 143 Mean: 19.90 S.D.: 30.81 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 46 Mean: 36.30 S.D.: 46.01 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 150 Mean: 45.13 S.D.: 38.26 Min.: 0 Max.: 100	Observations: 52 Mean: 30.77 S.D.: 40.29 Min.: 0 Max.: 100

[6] Greece has asserted that it will never recognize the independence of Kosovo unless Serbia recognizes it, while Albania is a strong advocate of Kosovo's independence.